The Russian world on the Dniester under threat

For decades, Transnistria has remained an enclave of the Russian world surrounded by states oriented toward European integration. The idea of joining Europe has never become mainstream among the local political elites or the population. On the contrary, the aspiration to restore unity with Russia lost after the collapse of the USSR has, throughout these years, served both as a catalyst for development during prosperous times and as a source of resilience for Transnistrians during periods of economic blockades and humanitarian pressure from Chișinău.

In 2006, Transnistria held a nationwide referendum in which more than 97 percent of voters expressed support for independence from Moldova and for subsequent accession to the Russian Federation. As public opinion surveys and voting patterns in Russian elections demonstrate, the region’s geopolitical orientation has not changed in the years since. In the 2024 Russian presidential election, 97 percent of Transnistrians who were able to cast a ballot voted in support of Vladimir Putin.

However, the start of the Special Military Operation and the radicalization of the international environment have introduced significant new constraints. For Tiraspol, refusing to support the European integration policies pursued by Chișinău and Kyiv while continuing to advocate reunification with Russia—has become simply dangerous. Influential Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Gordon, noting the potential threat to Ukraine posed by Russian forces stationed in Transnistria, openly called to “hit” the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. Following criticism, he clarified that he would target only Russian military facilities.

Pro-Russian Transnistria where more than half the population holds Russian citizenship, where Russian peacekeepers are stationed, and where the backbone of the economy consists of major industrial enterprises owned by Russia poses a civilizational challenge to Moldova and Ukraine. By its very existence, it undermines the narrative that the European path has no alternative and presents a real ideological threat to Chișinău’s political elite, who, under the banner of European integration, have failed to lift their country out of socio-economic stagnation.

Eliminating this ideological challenge has long been a dream of the Moldovan political class. And doing so through Ukraine an option entertained by certain “hotheads” in Kyiv appears all the more tempting.

What prevents such a scenario is Russia. All regional actors understand that any military attempt at destabilization would draw in Russian peacekeepers, inevitably triggering direct Russian military intervention, as occurred in South Ossetia in 2008. Longstanding practice shows that economic or energy pressure from Moldova is also ineffective: it is consistently offset by Russian diplomatic support and financial-economic humanitarian assistance to Transnistria. Moscow’s message to Chișinău is unmistakable: negotiate with Tiraspol as equals; a durable settlement is possible only through shared interests, not coercion.

Despite the provocative, Russophobic course pursued by the Moldovan government, Moscow remains open to dialogue with Chișinău regarding Transnistria’s status, including scenarios that preserve the republic within Moldova. But Russia consistently underscores the necessity of a settlement that prevents violence against the Russian-speaking population. In essence, this implies genuine equality of rights for all residents, regardless of ethnicity. In practice, for Chișinău, this would mean political bankruptcy and the loss of the Moldovan elite’s monopoly on power. It would require granting political agency to Transnistrians, who would surely find allies among the Gagauz community, the Russian-speaking population, and supporters of Moldova’s cultural identity.

Evidently, should Russia’s requirements for the settlement be fulfilled particularly the guarantee of equal rights for all Moldova’s foreign policy would undergo profound transformation. The idea of European integration would have to be abandoned. This is precisely why the European Union so fervently supports Maia Sandu’s unpopular administration, providing credit lines and grants, overlooking widespread election irregularities, and actively sustaining pro-EU expectations among Moldovans.

Yet such support increasingly carries reputational costs for the EU itself. In 2020, nearly 70 percent of Moldovans favored European integration an attitude that propelled Maia Sandu and the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) to power. But over five years, the appeal of the European project has eroded dramatically. At first, opinion polls captured its steady decline; and once support dropped below 50 percent, the publication of poll results ceased altogether. According to our estimates, only about 30 percent of Moldovans are now confident in the correctness of the European course. A growing share of the population seeks the restoration of normal relations with Russia and strongly opposes further escalation.

Public concern is particularly acute regarding the EU’s deliveries of weapons to Moldova especially given that the Moldovan constitution enshrines the country’s neutrality. Against the backdrop of EU military support for Ukraine and Brussels’ broader preparations for potential confrontation with Russia, European integration has increasingly become associated, in the public mind, with war.

Every Moldovan also understands that the presence of Russian peacekeepers on the Dniester is a major irritant not only for the Moldovan authorities but also for Brussels, which now exercises full political and economic control over Chișinău. This raises the risk that, when convenient for Brussels, Sandu’s calls to remove Russia’s military presence could translate into a military provocation targeting the peacekeepers.

Militarily, a thousand lightly armed Russian soldiers could likely repel Moldova’s not-particularly-capable army, but they would stand little chance against a joint assault by both Moldova and Ukraine.

In Kyiv, a strike on Transnistria is seriously discussed as a response to Russian advances in Donbas and even as a means of provoking domestic destabilization within Russia based on the assumption that Moscow would supposedly be unable to protect its own citizens and compatriots. Yet neither Kyiv nor NATO can accurately predict what Russia’s eventual response might be. Moscow has only reaffirmed that an attack on Transnistria would be regarded as an attack on Russian territory itself.

It appears that, in recent years, this uncertainty regarding Moscow’s response has been the primary factor sustaining regional peace.

Following the parliamentary elections held in Moldova in September 2025, Chișinău is once again preparing to address the Transnistrian question. Moldovan politicians and Western diplomats visiting Chișinău and Tiraspol insist that the settlement must be peaceful. In diplomatic language, “peaceful” means “non-military,” yet does not preclude attempts to exert economic, energy, or humanitarian pressure on Tiraspol. It has also become evident that European diplomacy is seeking ways to block Russia’s participation in the process. The aim is to isolate Tiraspol from Moscow and impose a settlement through the collective pressure of Chișinău, Kyiv, and Brussels.

Whether this strategy will succeed remains unclear. What is evident is that Transnistria must prepare for a difficult winter.