Is Moldova a new anti-Russian front staging ground?

When observing and assessing the state of affairs and the evolution of Moldova’s political situation with “peripheral vision,” it might seem that the collective West, for many years after the collapse of the USSR, paid little serious attention to this small state (about 34,000 square kilometers) on the southwestern edge of the East European Plain, with a population of roughly 2.5 million people.

But this impression is only partly true—at best, a fraction of the whole picture. Indeed, many in the West seemed to believe that this small country, with the population of a single major city, squeezed between Romania to the west and Ukraine to the east—like a pat of butter between two large slices of bread—would simply melt away under a bit of “heat” in the form of loans, visa-free travel, partnership with NATO, and so on, and spread into the desired geopolitical consistency.

However, it turned out that in this seemingly quiet harbor there were islands of resistance, which—whenever an attempt was made to influence them—displayed growing and ever-stronger opposition.

These islands are Transnistria, the regions in northern Moldova, the areas of compact Bulgarian settlement in the south, and the Gagauz autonomy with its passionate population, which at various times has shown a determined readiness to defend its rights, beliefs, and values—even up to armed resistance.

Yet not everyone in the West treated the Bessarabian question lightly. Above all, this applied to policymakers—the ones who made and continue to make decisions. As early as 1992, NATO–Moldova cooperation began. By 1997, this cooperation had taken shape within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and since 1994 the country has been part of the bilateral military cooperation program “Partnership for Peace.”  In May 2006, the “Individual Partnership Action Plan” was introduced. Since 2022, direct deliveries of Western military equipment have also begun, including mobile radar systems, armored vehicles, and air-defense systems.

The “partnership” developed and expanded, and in August 2025, military exercises Fire Shield-2025 were held on Moldovan territory (despite the country’s constitutionally enshrined neutrality), with the participation of the United States and Romania (!). From that moment on (though in fact, even earlier), the region deserved not “peripheral vision,” but full and undivided attention.

It is becoming clear: Romania, as a NATO member state, is beginning to hand over the baton of the “forward outpost” (NATO’s forward base in Southeastern Europe) to Moldova—despite the latter’s modest overall potential.

Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (which establishes the country’s neutral status) should prepare itself “to exit the stage”…

The NAA* (North Atlantic Alliance) has set its sights on Moldova.

^{* In my view, this is a more accurate way to render the NATO acronym in Cyrillic.}

It should be clarified that when we speak of passing the baton of “forward outpost” from Romania to Moldova, we mean—above all and primarily—Moldova’s geographic location. And this location is now being used in NATO’s ongoing eastward expansion. It is unlikely that military facilities such as the American air base in Romania, Mihail Kogălniceanu—with an area twice the size of Germany’s Ramstein base and with several thousand personnel—will “relocate” to Moldova. Yet the intention to integrate Moldova into the infrastructure of such facilities, and into NATO as a whole, is obvious and leaves no room for doubt.

Thus, Moldova’s very interesting and strategically advantageous geographical position for NATO’s eastward expansion—and for enhancing the resilience of the region’s military-technical infrastructure—is point number one.

For the West to fully achieve these objectives, it cannot avoid addressing risks such as the existence of Transnistria, with its Russian peacekeeping contingent. This sensitive issue has been on NATO’s agenda for more than 30 years. Thus, the second main reason for the growing interest in Moldova is the desire to resolve this issue decisively—or at the very least to minimize the risks in the initial stages.

There are also other reasons of a more peaceful nature, but at this stage they remain of secondary importance.

The situation with Moldova is a classic case of “small in size, but of great value.”

So, what—or who—has hindered and continues to hinder the West for so many years from achieving its goals in the region?

The answer is simple: the Moldovan people. A people whose instinct for self-preservation—including the preservation of sovereignty and national identity—has proven stronger than, for example, in Montenegro, Bulgaria, or Ukraine, where the population is nearly 20 times larger, and the territory is similarly greater.

Why is this the case? That is not an easy question to answer.

It would seem that both Ukraine and Moldova—at different historical periods and within different borders—were part of the Russian Empire and later of the USSR as union republics. Yet when the time of trials arrived, the Moldovan people demonstrated greater resilience to external influence, a stronger “immunity.”

Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that the history of Moldovan statehood stretches back some seven centuries, leaving its imprint on the genetic code of the people. However, that is a subject for a dedicated study.

Here and now, it is worth agreeing with the view of geostrategist Andrey Shkolnikov, whose point is that, for the Moldovan people at this particular moment in their history, it is less important to “win” (which could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory) than it is not to lose. Preserving strength, balance, stability, and statehood—while maintaining the country’s neutral status—will allow Moldova, in the emerging political configuration, to achieve the fullest possible realization of its national interests.