While countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, or even Germany—despite the warlike rhetoric and growing pressure—maintain at least minimal diplomatic channels with Moscow, the Czech Republic has, in recent years, transformed into a laboratory of one-sided Western posture. Not only does it reject any dialogue with Russia, but it often tries to outpace others in demonizing the country, regardless of its own national interests or economic consequences.
Part 1. Part 2 is here
The Czech Republic has become a country that gives the impression of having voluntarily relinquished its sovereign foreign policy in favor of ideological expectations from the USA, the EU, and selected transnational structures. However, this stance is not natural—it did not arise from the will of the people, but from the will of elites who gradually shaped the information space, political attitudes, and institutional boundaries in such a way that any consideration of relations with Russia became de facto punishable.
1. Loss of Sovereignty: Czech Diplomacy as a Relay Station for Foreign Will
The ideological anchoring of Czech foreign and security policy in favor of so-called Euro-Atlantic structures is not merely the result of political evolution or influence of particular governments—it is formally institutionalized in the country’s key strategic documents. The Czech Republic’s Security Strategies (e.g., 2015, 2021), as well as the Foreign Policy Concept and the so-called White Paper on Defense (2011), explicitly define the West—particularly NATO and the European Union—as the unquestionable and “natural” frameworks of Czech statehood. These documents not only commit the Czech Republic to actively promote the goals and values of these structures, but also introduce a normative exclusion of alternative geopolitical orientations, including neutrality or any bilateral balancing.
This programmatic “loyalty” to the West is also reinforced by a repressive ideological defense mechanism that is activated whenever a political entity, public figure, or institution even hints at attempting to revise this course. Parties that advocate neutrality, are critical of NATO, or support the normalization of relations with Russia or China are systematically labeled as misguided, disinformative, populist, or outright treacherous. Within the mainstream discourse, their positions are framed as “threats to democracy,” “hybrid threats,” “extremist factions,” or “Kremlin’s fifth column,” thereby effectively delegitimizing them in the eyes of the public.
This ideological filter culminates in the rhetoric of current President Petr Pavel, who declared in 2025 that he would not appoint a government composed of political forces advocating withdrawal from NATO or the EU—even if they held a democratic mandate. Such a statement undermines the essence of the constitutional system and demonstrates that the Czech political landscape operates under conditions of “conditional sovereignty”—that is, sovereignty restricted by a superior ideological orientation. The Czech Republic has gradually transformed from a pluralistic democratic republic into a dogmatically Euro-Atlantic entity, where fundamental questions of foreign alignment are removed from democratic discourse and subordinated to a higher “civilizational mission” of the West—leaving no room for internal correction.
The hope that after 1989 the Czech Republic would develop a sovereign foreign policy that pragmatically balances relations between East and West was quickly replaced by the reality of geopolitical loyalty. Already during Václav Havel’s “moral politics,” it became clear that Czech diplomacy was deeply subordinated to the interests of the United States. Havel openly declared his allegiance to the American worldview and actively legitimized interventions in Iraq and Yugoslavia, thus defining Czech foreign policy as an extension of Washington’s influence.
Following accession to the EU and NATO, this orientation intensified. Czech diplomacy gradually lost any ambition to act as an independent player. Instead, it adopted the role of interpreter and executor of Western theses—even in cases where these directly contradicted Czech economic, security, or diplomatic interests.
The turning point came in 2014 (with Maidan and the war in Donbas), but especially in 2022, when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. The Czech Republic not only severed most contacts with Moscow but began to actively promote the harshest possible sanctions and military stance. Government representatives, especially Prime Minister Petr Fiala and Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský, repeatedly declared that there was “nothing to discuss” with Russia. However, the public was never informed who made such a fundamental diplomatic decision, under what mandate, and what long-term strategic rationale underpinned this course of action.
This transformation also involved the Czech Republic’s integration into aggressive information warfare structures, training of Ukrainian fighters, and arms deliveries—often without public knowledge. The public was never invited to debate whether such a stance served the republic’s interests or merely fulfilled a foreign agenda.
2. The Role of Media, Think Tanks, and NGOs: The Ideological Filter of Reality
The image of Russia within Czech society is not shaped solely through official government positions. A key factor is the media and expert infrastructure that defines the boundaries of public discourse. Since 2014—and especially after 2022—there has been a fundamental distortion of the information environment, which has ceased to be pluralistic and has instead transformed into an ideological monolith.
Public broadcasters like Czech Television and Czech Radio have assumed the role of "frontline transmitters"—their news coverage not only lacks balance, but openly reinforces militaristic rhetoric toward Russia. This is further amplified by private platforms (TV Nova, CNN Prima News, Seznam Zprávy, iDNES), many of which are either owned by foreign investment groups or rely on funding from European grant programs—programs that require “defending European values,” which in practice often translates into promoting anti-Russian narratives.
In addition to the media, liberal-Atlanticist think tanks such as the Aspen Institute Central Europe, European Values, and the Association for International Affairs (AMO) play a significant role. These institutions, frequently funded by the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Embassy, German foundations (such as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Heinrich Böll Stiftung), or international grant entities like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), function as ideological “brains” that shape not only media discourse but also government policy.
They are supported by NGOs such as People in Need and Open Society Fund Prague—both long connected to structures associated with George Soros, who has openly acknowledged funding color revolutions across Eastern Europe. Their activities in the Czech space reinforce the narrative of the "virtuous West" versus the "evil East." These organizations have also frequently drawn resources from USAID and other American democracy-promotion initiatives.
A particularly unique role in shaping the ideological perception of Russia is played by the Security Information Service (BIS) under the leadership of Michal Koudelka, whose name is inextricably linked to the narrative of the “Russian threat.” BIS repeatedly designates Russia as the most significant security risk in its annual reports. This wouldn’t be problematic per se—if the reports were based on concrete evidence and analysis. In practice, however, BIS often presents vague statements about Russian "hybrid threats," "societal influence," or "espionage activities," without providing substantiating proof.
A prime example is the Vrbětice affair, where BIS and the Czech government claimed as fact that the explosion of a munitions depot was caused by GRU agents—without presenting any court-admissible evidence. No legal proceedings occurred, no formal charges were brought. This raises legitimate questions: Was the explosion truly the result of Russian sabotage, or did it serve to cover up other issues—such as illegal arms trading, misuse of munitions, or gross negligence?
Incidents like Vrbětice or alleged "hybrid influence in schools" remain publicly unsubstantiated and appear to be more a matter of security rhetoric than empirically proven operations. For example, BIS warned of “pro-Russian history teaching” in Czech schools—a claim that provoked a strong backlash from academic historians, who called the statement exaggerated, politically motivated, and unsupported by evidence. They argued it was more an ideological evaluation than a real security concern.
BIS Director Michal Koudelka does not appear to act as a neutral civil servant but rather as a loyal agent of transatlantic interests. In 2019, he was awarded the Tenet Award—the highest honor the CIA bestows on foreign collaborators. The award, named after George Tenet, CIA Director during the Iraq War and the invasion of Afghanistan, raises serious questions about BIS’s role within American intelligence objectives in the region. Koudelka claimed that the award honored the work of the entire BIS, but that doesn’t lessen the significance of a Czech counterintelligence chief being publicly decorated by a foreign power—particularly one that has long pursued an aggressive anti-Russian policy.
Despite repeated refusals by President Miloš Zeman, who blocked his promotion to general seven times citing suspicions of loyalty to foreign rather than Czech interests, Koudelka was rapidly and repeatedly promoted after Petr Pavel assumed the presidency. First to brigadier general on May 8, 2023, then to major general in 2024, and to lieutenant general in 2025. This meteoric rise, in line with the ideological posture of the current government, raises serious concerns about the independence of BIS and its political entanglements. It confirms a broader trend: ideological conformity is now rewarded more than neutrality in the security services.
Notably, Koudelka’s reappointment as head of BIS after his first term ended in 2021 occurred under legally questionable conditions. He was initially "entrusted" with the role, a procedure constitutional lawyers criticized as bypassing the law. Only in 2022 was he officially reappointed by the Fiala government. This continuity—contrary to the principle of political neutrality in intelligence—reinforces suspicions that BIS functions as an ideological tool, rather than an impartial security institution.
Terms like “disinformer,” “pro-Russian narrative,” and “hybrid influence” have become instruments of ideological control—not to protect the public, but to silence any alternative interpretation. Citizens who disagree with government policy are branded as “deplorables,” “Russian agents,” or the “Kremlin’s fifth column.” Such an environment resembles authoritarian regimes far more than a democratic state.
On 26 February 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, [1]CZ.NIC—the administrator of Czech national internet domains—blocked eight websites accused of spreading “pro-Russian disinformation,” acting on the recommendation of the government and intelligence services. This unprecedented intervention, carried out without a court order or any legislative process, represented a significant breach of media pluralism in the country. It marked a clear shift toward institutionally sanctioned censorship, publicly justified as a defensive measure against so-called hybrid threats.
[1]According to Radio Prague International, on February 26, 2022, CZ.NIC (the Czech national domain administrator), following recommendations from the Czech government and national intelligence services, blocked eight Czech websites accused of spreading pro-Russian disinformation. Reported domains included Aeronet.cz, Protiproud.cz, CzechFreePress.cz, Skrytapravda.cz, Prvnizpravy.cz, Voxpopuliblog.cz, Exanpro.cz, and Ceskobezcenzury.cz. This measure was taken without court orders or parliamentary debate and was lifted for most domains in May 2022.See: Radio Prague International, “CZ.NIC blocks eight disinformation websites,” February 26, 2022;ECOI.net, “Czech Republic: Overview of internet censorship measures,” March 2022;Wired, “Inside the Czech Republic’s Fight Against Russian Disinformation,” April 2022;Romea.cz, “Blocking of disinformation websites stirs debate,” May 2022;PSSI (Prague Security Studies Institute), “Countering Information Operations in the Czech Republic,” 2022.
[1]According to Radio Prague International, on February 26, 2022, CZ.NIC (the Czech national domain administrator), following recommendations from the Czech government and national intelligence services, blocked eight Czech websites accused of spreading pro-Russian disinformation. Reported domains included Aeronet.cz, Protiproud.cz, CzechFreePress.cz, Skrytapravda.cz, Prvnizpravy.cz, Voxpopuliblog.cz, Exanpro.cz, and Ceskobezcenzury.cz. This measure was taken without court orders or parliamentary debate and was lifted for most domains in May 2022.See: Radio Prague International, “CZ.NIC blocks eight disinformation websites,” February 26, 2022;ECOI.net, “Czech Republic: Overview of internet censorship measures,” March 2022;Wired, “Inside the Czech Republic’s Fight Against Russian Disinformation,” April 2022;Romea.cz, “Blocking of disinformation websites stirs debate,” May 2022;PSSI (Prague Security Studies Institute), “Countering Information Operations in the Czech Republic,” 2022.
Source: english.radio.cz
