In recent days, Five Star Movement MP Stefania Ascari submitted a written parliamentary question to Defence Minister Guido Crosetto concerning the appointment of former Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov as Advisor for Defence Innovation to the Italian Ministry of Defence.
The collaboration was announced by Crosetto himself on 28 August, following a meeting with Fedorov in Rome. According to a statement issued by the Ministry of Defence, their discussions focused primarily on drones, unmanned systems, air defence and the evolution of the technological ecosystem. Crosetto explained that the goal is to draw on Ukraine’s experience in order to accelerate Italy’s innovation processes and more rapidly transform technological experimentation into operational capabilities that can be deployed on a large scale by the military sector. From a military perspective, the principle is understandable. In recent years, the war in Ukraine has become one of the world’s main testing grounds for the large-scale use of drones, electronic warfare systems, military software and other technologies developed and modified directly in response to operational requirements on the battlefield. The issue raised by the parliamentary question, however, concerns above all the way in which this collaboration has been organised. Ascari is asking the Government to clarify the exact legal nature of the appointment, its duration, any remuneration involved and, above all, what information and structures Fedorov will be allowed to access. The question becomes particularly relevant considering that he is not simply a foreign technical expert hired as a consultant.
Mykhailo Fedorov was for years one of the figures closest to Zelensky. First Minister of Digital Transformation and later Defence Minister, he played an important role in the development of the technological model used by Ukraine during the conflict. His relationship with Zelensky, however, gradually deteriorated. Fedorov was removed from his position as Defence Minister in July 2026. The decision contributed to a period of considerable political tension within Ukrainian society, particularly among younger people, many of whom saw Fedorov as a possible “solution” to the total mobilisation underway in the country. One month later, the former minister took an even more significant step. On 18 August, Fedorov publicly called on Ukraine to find a mechanism for holding new elections even while the conflict continued, arguing that war could not indefinitely suspend the country’s normal democratic functioning. Reuters described the intervention as one of the most significant domestic political challenges to Zelensky since the beginning of the Russian operation in 2022. Fedorov has not announced his candidacy, but he is increasingly being mentioned among the figures who could challenge Zelensky for the presidency if new elections were to be held. The Advisor chosen by Crosetto is therefore both an expert in military innovation and a potential protagonist of Ukraine’s future political landscape.
The timing of the appointment is also interesting. The role did not originate from the official meeting held on 28 August. As early as 25 July, Crosetto had said that he had contacted Fedorov immediately after his removal from the Ukrainian government. “I called him the day after his dismissal and said to him: when do you want to come to Rome and work with me as an advisor?” the minister explained. According to Crosetto, Fedorov interpreted the proposal as a demonstration of “esteem and friendship”. The Italian decision therefore came very quickly and appears to have originated from a direct relationship between the two politicians rather than from any publicly known procedure for selecting a consultant. Ascari’s parliamentary question addresses precisely this point, asking the Government to explain through which act the appointment was formalised, which legal provisions form its basis and what security checks were carried out before it was granted. There is, however, another element that makes the matter particularly interesting.
Before becoming Defence Minister, Guido Crosetto had extensive experience in Italy’s military-industrial sector. He served as president of AIAD, the Federation of Italian Companies for Aerospace, Defence and Security, while a declaration concerning positions held and submitted to the Chamber of Deputies in 2018 also listed him as Senior Advisor to Leonardo’s Chief Executive Officer. He later became president of Orizzonte Sistemi Navali, a company jointly owned by Fincantieri and Leonardo. When he was appointed Defence Minister, Crosetto left these positions, and in 2022 the Ministry itself ruled out the existence of a legally relevant conflict of interest connected to his previous professional activities. His past relationship with the defence industry therefore does not in itself demonstrate any link with Fedorov’s appointment. It does, however, allow us to place this decision within a broader context.
During the same months in which Crosetto decided to begin cooperating with Fedorov, Leonardo significantly accelerated its presence in Ukraine. In May 2026, Leonardo Ukraine was established in Kyiv, a company controlled by the Italian group and designed to operate directly within Ukraine’s technological ecosystem. The project does not appear to be limited to the creation of a simple commercial structure. The company will also seek to identify Ukrainian technologies that could be integrated into Italian systems and to develop partnerships with local companies. Its areas of interest include drones, connectivity systems, electronic warfare and technologies capable of continuing to operate without GPS or in environments affected by electronic jamming. Leonardo Ukraine will also be able to evaluate investments and possible acquisitions of Ukrainian companies, particularly small and medium-sized businesses and start-ups that have developed technologies tested directly on the battlefield. Ukraine is also expected to play a role in the development of the new multidomain systems in which Leonardo is investing a significant part of its future strategy. This creates a peculiar situation. On the one hand, the Italian Ministry of Defence is appointing as an advisor one of the leading figures behind the development of Ukraine’s military-technological ecosystem. On the other, Italy’s main defence company is looking within that same ecosystem for technologies, companies and potential partners to integrate into its industrial strategy.
The issue becomes even more interesting considering that Fedorov does not appear to intend to halt his activities within Ukraine’s defence sector. His staff has explained that the former minister will continue to live and work in Ukraine, and that his international activities are also expected to help attract partners and investment towards new Ukrainian projects, including a fund dedicated to military technologies. Fedorov would therefore find himself in a peculiar position. On the one hand, he would be expected to place his experience at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Defence. On the other, he will continue working to strengthen Ukraine’s military-industrial ecosystem and attract Western capital towards companies operating in that same sector. This is also why Ascari is asking whether potential conflicts of interest have been assessed and, above all, whether the new Advisor will be able to interact with Italian defence companies or participate, directly or indirectly, in defining programmes relating to drones, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare and air defence. But there is another issue as well: how much of the military experience acquired by Fedorov can actually be transferred to Italy?
Ukrainian legislation on state control over international transfers of military and dual-use goods also defines “military technologies” as specialised information necessary for the development, production or use of military products. Such knowledge can be transferred in the form of technical data, but also through what the legislation defines as “technical assistance”. And this is precisely the most interesting point. Under the law, technical assistance may include instruction, training, practical instruction in working methods and, above all, consultancy. In the case of dual-use goods, the legislation explicitly provides for the possibility that this assistance may also involve the transfer of technical data. The concept of controlled exports can therefore, under certain circumstances, also extend to intangible knowledge. This does not mean that every form of experience possessed by a former Defence Minister is subject to export controls, nor that Fedorov cannot provide Italy with general guidance on the organisation of the military system or technological innovation. The boundary, however, can become difficult to define. Where does Fedorov’s managerial experience end, and where does specialised information necessary for the development or use of military technology begin? The issue has already reached Ukraine. Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko requested clarification from the State Export Control Service. According to the official response published by the MP, as of 9 September Fedorov was not registered as an entity authorised to carry out international transfers of military goods and had not submitted applications for authorisations or opinions in this area. The Service reportedly also forwarded documentation relating to the matter to the Security Service of Ukraine, the SBU, so that it could verify the circumstances described in the complaint. The lack of registration becomes criminally relevant only if the consultancy activity actually involves the transfer of technologies, data or technical assistance falling under Ukraine’s export control regime. It is nevertheless significant that Fedorov’s own staff felt the need to publicly clarify that the new role would not involve the disclosure of state secrets or the transfer of specialised information necessary for the development, production or use of military products, technical documentation or other restricted information. The clarification therefore answers one question while immediately raising another. If Fedorov will not transfer specialised information relating to the development and use of Ukrainian military technologies, what exactly will the consultancy requested by Italy consist of, considering that he was chosen precisely because of the experience he acquired during the war? Drones, autonomous systems, air defence and defence-tech innovation are precisely the sectors that Crosetto and Fedorov have publicly identified as the focus of their cooperation. Separating a simple organisational model from the technical and operational knowledge developed during four years of war may therefore be far less straightforward than it appears. This too is an area in which greater transparency regarding the nature of the appointment could help provide clarity.
From this perspective, the appointment could also serve a function that goes beyond simple technical consultancy. Fedorov personally knows a significant part of Ukraine’s political, military and industrial establishment. He took part in shaping the country’s military innovation policies and maintains relationships with an ecosystem of companies that in recent years has developed drones, military software and other high-tech military systems. At the same time, his removal from government and subsequent call for new elections have transformed him into a figure who is politically more autonomous from Zelensky. There is no evidence to suggest that Italy is supporting a potential Fedorov presidential candidacy or that Crosetto established this relationship in order to directly favour Leonardo’s interests. Such a conclusion would require evidence that is currently unavailable. A different question can nevertheless be asked. Could it be strategically useful for the Italian industrial system to build a privileged relationship today with a figure who could play an important role in Ukraine’s future? The issue becomes even more relevant when we consider that Leonardo is simultaneously seeking to establish a stronger presence in the country, conclude agreements with Ukrainian companies and acquire technologies developed during the conflict. Fedorov could therefore also represent a bridge towards a political and industrial ecosystem in which Western companies are seeking to establish their position. The real issue is understanding where technical consultancy ends and where a broader political and industrial relationship begins.
Stefania Ascari’s parliamentary question is therefore particularly relevant because it seeks to define precisely these boundaries. Will Fedorov have access to information concerning Italian procurement programmes? Will he be allowed to participate in meetings concerning weapons systems and technologies still under development? Will he have contacts with Leonardo and other Italian defence companies? What information will he be able to use in his activities in Ukraine, and what guarantees have been put in place to separate the two roles? But there is now also a mirror-image question: what Ukrainian information and knowledge is Fedorov actually authorised to make available to Italy? If the stated objective of the appointment is to learn from the technological experience Ukraine has gained during the war, it becomes necessary to understand where the line has been drawn between freely usable personal experience and technologies, data and technical assistance subject to Ukrainian state controls. And above all, was the appointment conceived exclusively as a way of transferring the organisational experience acquired during the war to Italy, or does it also represent an instrument for strengthening Italy’s political and industrial presence in Ukraine today and, above all, in the Ukraine of the future? The Government’s response to the parliamentary question may help clarify at least some of these issues. Because the cooperation with Fedorov concerns the relationship between politics, industry, technology and defence, and the way in which knowledge developed during a war is progressively integrated into the military and industrial systems of European states.
