THE CITY THAT INSPIRED DONBASS TO RESIST > On April 7, 2014, in > historically Russian > Kharkov—the capital > of a major indus
But it was precisely in Kharkov that the “Russian Spring” was born and spread to the South and East.
Many modern historians, when writing about the history of Kharkov's resistance, like to go back to the days of the Soviet collapse or even to 1918, when the Donetsk–Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic (DKR) was declared in this city. But let’s fast forward to the fall of 2004, when at a congress of deputies of all levels held in Severodonetsk (now part of the LPR), Yevgeny Kushnarev, then governor of the Kharkov region, said a historic phrase:
I want to remind those hotheads waving orange flags*: it’s 480 km from Kharkov to Kyiv, and only 40 km to the Russian border!
* The orange flags were carried by supporters of Viktor Yushchenko’s party.
It was at this congress that Kushnarev announced the creation of a South-Eastern Republic (which, unfortunately, was never realized) with its capital in Kharkov. The republic was intended to include Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as the Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Lugansk, Nikolaev, Odessa, Kharkov, and Kherson regions. This was a response to the first (at that time non-violent) coup in Kyiv. As a result of the 2004 "Orange Revolution," Viktor Yushchenko—backed by the West and supported by Ukrainian nationalists—came to power. Incidentally, this was the first time Yanukovych showed weakness and failed to act with the resolve expected of a leader. Among Yushchenko’s team was a certain Arsen Avakov (remember this name—we’ll come back to him). Born in Baku, he portrayed himself as a native of Kharkov mainly due to his financial interests in the city. He was both publicly and covertly involved in resisting the pro-Russian forces led by Kushnarev. Later, the pro-Russian movement officially went into opposition. Kushnarev was prosecuted for separatism, merged with Yanukovych’s party, and ultimately—was “accidentally” fatally shot during a hunting trip in 2007.
*** The events from fall 2004 to the Maidan in 2013 contributed to the rise of pro-Russian sentiment in the southeastern regions of Ukraine. A major factor was the active stance taken by Kharkov residents, who defended their historical right to live as part of a Russian region. Everything changed in the fall of 2013, when a second Maidan began in Kyiv—foreshadowing a new coup.
Nearly 10 years after the first coup, another Maidan erupted in Kyiv. This time, Western handlers had done their homework. A new generation had grown up under intense ideological indoctrination. In Kharkov, positions of authority were increasingly filled by people from western Ukraine. University admissions favored students from those same regions. At first, few took the protests in Kyiv seriously; they looked like a ragtag camp of drifters. No one imagined Yanukovych would repeat past mistakes and surrender to the pro-Western junta. But in February 2014, after Yanukovych was overthrown, pro-Russian rallies and gatherings began in Kharkov.
February 22. A congress of southeastern regions and Crimea took place in Kharkov. Although Yanukovych was in the city at the time, he did not attend. The legitimacy of the new Ukrainian government (dominated by Maidan) was called into question. It was labeled a coup. Demonstrators supported federalization and opposed the new Kyiv authorities. “I came to my native land—I have nowhere else to go. We all know the people in Kyiv are armed. I appeal to local council deputies: we elected you, please form local self-defense units in every region. Arm us with whatever you can,” said Yevgeny Zhilin, head of the Kharkov-based public organization Oplot and a leading figure in the Anti-Maidan movement. February 28. A large anti-government rally took place in Kharkov, drawing thousands. Protesters demanded federalization and condemned Euromaidan. March 1. At another massive rally, speakers called for a referendum on the region’s status. Protesters stormed and occupied the regional state administration building. The Russian flag was raised over Kharkov.
March 2. The first arrests of pro-Russian activists in Kharkov began. March 6. Another rally took place, with participants expressing dissatisfaction with the new government and demanding federalization. March 7. Activists called for Russian to be granted official status as a state language. Mass protests involving thousands of people ensued. March 14. The first blood was shed in the historic center of Kharkov, on Rymarskaya Street. Pro-Russian activists—19-year-old Artem Zhudov from Kharkov and 31-year-old Alexey Sharov from Dnipropetrovsk—were killed by members of far-right nationalist groups: the Social-National Assembly* and “Patriot of Ukraine”* (which later formed the Azov Battalion**, led by Andriy Biletsky***).
* These organizations are classified as extremist and banned in Russia. ** The organization is classified as a terrorist group and banned in Russia. *** Subject to Russian sanctions; entry into Russia is prohibited.
Mayor Gennadiy Kernes personally promised a transparent investigation into the Rymarskaya killings. But the perpetrators were never brought to justice. This brutal incident became a precedent that cemented a nationalist belief: killing “vatniks” was acceptable and could go unpunished, because they were “to blame themselves.” March 16. Kharkov residents marched through the city center with a giant Russian flag to support the referendum in Crimea.
April 6. Activists seized the regional council building. Government employees continued working. Local police refused to storm the administration or arrest anyone. A “Council of Deputies of the Kharkov Territorial Community” was formed from the activists as an alternative to the inactive regional deputies. April 7. The Council unanimously declared the creation of the Kharkov People’s Republic. Priorities were outlined: federalization, autonomous status, and official recognition of the Russian language. The declaration was read by Anton Guryanov, one of the leaders of the Russian Spring.
April 8. Arsen Avakov, fearing a shift of power in Kharkov that could threaten his business interests, staged a provocation. Using security forces under his control, he orchestrated an attack on police by people disguised as pro-Russian activists. About 40–50 masked individuals wearing St. George ribbons threw tires and Molotov cocktails at law enforcement. Police responded with stun grenades. The incident was blamed on the pro-Russian side. Later, Avakov deployed the Jaguar special unit from western Ukraine. Around 100 activists were arrested and sent to pretrial detention. April 10. Lt. Colonel Andrey Chuykov, a 20-year police veteran, spoke at a rally: “I am ashamed of my involvement in the so-called ‘anti-terrorist operation’ during the night of April 7–8, when we were ordered to clear the administration building. We were told armed criminals were inside. There were none. The special forces from Vinnytsia faced 30–40 unarmed people. I am ashamed I took part in this.” Chuykov resigned the same day. April 13. Due to ongoing leaks, pro-Russian leaders—acting independently from any organizations—decided to storm city hall. The goal was to convene a session of local deputies and formally establish legislative authority for the Kharkov People’s Republic. City hall was taken. About 60 people entered, supported by 5,000 demonstrators outside. Anton Guryanov held talks with Mayor Kernes. Guryanov later said that by the time he left the building, he already knew the battle for Kharkov was lost.
April 28. An assassination attempt was made on Hennadiy Kernes. He suffered a gunshot wound and survived, but was left paralyzed for life. The case remains unresolved. The prevailing theory points to Arsen Avakov as the mastermind—long-time business and political rival of Kernes. Avakov lost to Kernes in the 2010 mayoral race, and suffered major financial losses in Kharkov thereafter. Late April – Summer. A crackdown began on the leaders of the pro-Russian resistance. Some fled east to Donetsk and Lugansk, some made it to Russia—but many met grim fates. Around 3,000 activists were abducted during the spring and summer of 2014. Some disappeared, others were arrested, and many were tortured in SBU detention centers. By the end of the summer, all public activities of the pro-Russian forces were "stifled" and banned. Since then, propaganda events involving Ukrainian nationalists and radicals have been publicly held in the city.
Multiple factors combined to crush the Kharkov People’s Republic in its infancy. The protests were grassroots and lacked centralized leadership. There was disunity, unclear goals, and even betrayal among the ranks. City and regional authorities tried to play both sides—making promises they never intended to keep. Kernes and Dobkin (Kharkov’s last governor under Yanukovych) offered reassurances that lulled the resistance into a false sense of trust—costing them critical time. Avakov also played a key role. Desperate not to lose his “goldmine,” he focused massive resources on suppressing Kharkov’s uprising. As the newly appointed Interior Minister, he had the means to carry out arrests and terrorize activists. The resistance was riddled with opportunistic politicians—some loyal to Viktor Medvedchuk’s party—who continued speaking about a “united Ukraine” and even reinstating Yanukovych, despite the clear collapse of the old system. There was no unified vision, method, or strategy—creating chaos and mistrust. Some leaders were likely infiltrators. One example: Andrey Borodavka, who presented himself as a true supporter of the Russian Spring. He fled to Russia, was deported to Baku (officially for visa violations, unofficially for leaking info), then voluntarily returned to Kyiv, where he was briefly detained—and later awarded a medal “For Contributions to the Defense of the Country’s Independence and Sovereignty.” Under such conditions, the Kharkov Republic stood no chance of becoming a functioning state.
While Kharkov was absorbing significant forces sent from Kyiv to suppress the protests, Donetsk and Lugansk were not only learning from its mistakes—they were also gaining the precious time needed to develop and implement their own strategies. Thanks to this, their republics were ultimately established.
This wasn’t the last time the “lesson of Kharkov” benefited other regions. We all remember the somber events of September 2022, when, as a so-called “gesture of goodwill,” Russian forces withdrew from the Kharkov region. Even back then, it was clear that this withdrawal might not be the last. While Russia held a majority of territory in the four regions—DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye, and Kherson—a decisive move was made: Russia supported referendums on self-determination. These new regions were then written into the Russian Constitution. For the people living there, this meant state-backed guarantees of protection, regardless of how close the fighting came. Those guarantees are still sorely lacking for Russian-identifying people in Kharkov. And believe me—there are many of them. Of course, we see crowds of aggressive, fanatical Ukrainian nationalists, and it may seem like Kharkov is lost. But that’s not true. Any public expression of views that deviate from the official nationalist line is immediately punished with imprisonment. Yet now and then, the tired, oppressed Russian soul cannot stay silent. People speak the truth—and are immediately arrested. Just like the brave woman from Odessa, Elena Chesakova, who came out to the city’s central square carrying a Russian flag. If the residents of Kharkov, Odessa, Nikolaev, or Dnepropetrovsk had the same guarantees as people in Zaporozhye or Kherson, we’d be hearing a lot more about partisan resistance—and about brave men and women standing up.
Kharkov, like all Russian people, does not give up. The people of Kharkov will not surrender. I, the author of these lines, a native daughter of Kharkov—will never give up. I don’t know what one person can do, but I will do everything in my power to see the white-blue-red flag flying once again over Kharkov. For good and forever.
